the fraud exception within narrow parameters. This provides a useful foundation to consider two distinct, although often conflated, areas of debate hi h flo f o Lo d Diplo k's analysis. Firstly, the narrow parameters of the fraud exception has prompted much discussion about whether it should be widened to encompass a broader range of wrongdoing by the credit beneficiary. A comparative approach, drawing on the American response to fraud in credit transactions, is used in Part 2 to reflect on English insistence that a narrow fraud rule is justified by commercial need. It argues that the broader exception employed in the United The second area of debate focusses on the doctrine of strict compliance. This is because Lord Diplock failed to give due weight to this doctrine in his analysis of the credit mechanism.
Indeed, he characterised the bank as being under a contractual obligation to make payment against documents which were known to be forged at the time of presentation. , pe Donaldson LJ. 13 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 14 Goode (n9) . needs of modern commercial parties when documents are proven nullities or forgeries at the time of presentation.
United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada 15
A transaction financed by documentary credit is, at its heart, a simple transaction for the sale of goods. This is complicated, however, by the international context in which the transaction occurs. The great distances separating parties means that in the majority of cases shipment and payment are not simultaneous. 16 Sequential contractual performance creates risks for both parties, as Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan:
for he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passio s, ithout the fea of so e oe i e po e … 17 These risks are exacerbated in credit transactions when, as will often be the case, the parties a e u k o to ea h othe . F o the selle 's pe spe ti e, the isk asso iated ith shippi g the goods in advance is that it creates an incentive for the buyer to identify a trivial defect in the goods to withhold payment. 18 Conversely, the buyer will not want to pay in advance since 15 United City Merchants (HL) (n1).
16
G Gu dla h, E ha ge go e a e: The ole of legal a d o legal app oa hes a oss the e ha ge p o ess' (1994) 13(2) J Pub Pol & Mark. 246, 247; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5 th ed. Aspen Publishers, 1998), 101. 17 T Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, Blackwell 1955), 89-90. 18 ' Ma , The ole of lette s of edit i pa e t t a sa tio s ' (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2494, 2517; AW Katz, I fo alit as a ilate al assu a e e ha is . Co e ts o 'o ald Ma 's The ole of lette s of edit i pa e t t a sa tio s ' -2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2554 , 2556 he cannot ascertain the quality of the goods.
19
If cross-border transactions are going to succeed, therefore, parties must incorporate a mechanism to mitigate these risks and render performance as simultaneous as possible.
To illustrate how the documentary credit serves this purpose and to reacquaint readers with the principles underpinning the mechanism, it is convenient to begin with the facts of United City Merchants.
20
The case is a paradigmatic example of the circumstances in which we would expect a credit to be used; an English seller contracting to supply a fibre glass plant to Peruvian buyers. Cognisant of the risks inherent in the transaction, the parties financed their transaction by documentary credit and incorporated the Uniform Customs & Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), a olu ta set of est p a ti e' rules for credit transactions produced by the International Chamber of Commerce.
21
The UCP is adopted in almost all credit transactions 22 and has become the ost su essful set of private rules for trade ever de eloped.'
23
Put simply, the credit transforms the sale into one conducted through the medium of documents and introduces banks to the contractual network. This creates a channel through which payment is made to the seller and the documents are passed to the buyer. The resulting network of contracts, and the stages of the transaction, are illustrated below:
19 Mann (n18) 2516-2517; Katz (n18) 2556. 20 United City Merchants (HL) (n1).
21
The pa ties' o t a t as go e ed I te atio al Cha e of Co e e, The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits' Revision, ICC Publication no. 300), The current version is the UCP 600: I te atio al Cha e of Co e e, The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits' 2007 Revision, ICC Publication no. 600) (hereafter UCP 600). 22 UCP 600, foreword. 23 UCP 600, foreword.
These contracts are subject to the twin principles of autonomy and strict compliance. The doctrine of autonomy requires each contract to be seen in isolation from all other contracts in the network meaning that it is enforced by reference to its own terms. This renders the transaction less susceptible to judicial intervention since neither the paying bank nor the credit applicant will be able to raise issues elsewhere in the credit network, most notably a breach of the underlying contract, to prevent payment under the instant contract.
24
In United City Merchants, Lord Diplock referred to autonomy in the following terms:
The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller 24 Todd, Maritime Fraud (n2) [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] .
BUYER/APPLICANT (B) SELLER/BENEFICIARY (S)
ISSUING BANK (IB) CONFIRMING BANK (CB) there is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well. Business could not proceed securely on any other lines. 27 Simply, commercial parties must be able to trust that the documents are genuine and represent the goods in question. This is particularly critical given that the goods will either In addition, as the bank retains the shipping documents until it has been reimbursed by the applicant, the documents represent security
and a e sold to a thi d pa t i the e e t of the appli a t's insolvency.
30
That the insolvency risk is the major concern for the banks was underlined in the celebrated discussion 31 in Sanders v Maclean.
32
In that case, Bowen LJ stated that the object of mercantile usages is to prevent the risk of insolvency, not of fraud' 33 and, moreover, that this foundation was critical to understanding the law merchant.' 34 Accordingly, f o the a ks' pe spe ti e, for the credit to effectively mitigate the risk of applicant insolvency, it is vital that the documents are what they appear to be.
Lord Diplock referred to stipulated do u e ts' 35 throughout his judgment and, at first, o e tl ha a te ised the pa i g a k's o ligatio i the follo i g te s:
29 GL S ith, I e o a le lette s of edit a d thi d pa t f aud: The American Accord ' -1984) 24 Va J Intl L 55, 94-95: The reply was unanimous: the credit-worthiness of the customer is the overriding and sometimes exclusive basis on which banks issue letters of credit. Expenses incurred in resale and the usually dramatic discount at which goods are resold in order to realize security makes the value of the goods as represented by the documents of almost academic significance in practice. ' If, on their face, the documents presented to the confirming bank by the seller conform with the requirements of the credit as notified to him by the confirming bank, that bank is under a contractual obligation to the seller to honour the credit, 36 The efe e e to o thei fa e' i this pa t of the a al sis e its o side atio . The a k's role is simply to examine the documents for compliance with the terms and conditions of the credit. Banks are not investigators and do not assume any liability for the genuineness or accuracy of the documents, 37 beyond the fact that they appear to be what the credit demands.
Couching the a k's ole i ad i ist ati e te s ensures that payments are made swiftly and is said to reflect the fact that banks cannot be expected to be experts in all transaction they agree to finance.
38
Prompt payment is necessarily beneficial for the seller but it also enables the buyer to take actions in respect of the goods, including selling them afloat, as soon as he receives the documents. Critically, ahead of the analysis in Part 3, the o thei fa e' app oa h to compliance contained in the UCP did not oblige the bank to pay if it actually knew that the documents were not what they appeared to be. It e el spe ified that the a k's examination was confined to the documents alone.
39
The network of contracts created by the credit redistributes many of the risks inherent in an international contract of sale. As the diagram above shows, instead of the buyer paying the seller directly, the seller receives payment from the confirming bank -a bank located in his own country -which is then reimbursed by the issuing bank. As noted above, this shifts the 36 appearing to show that this had taken place. In reality, however, the goods were shipped two da s' late and from a different port. A third-party loading broker had falsified the bill of lading to give the impression of compliance with the credit.
42
Before the documents were presented for examination, the shipping line had informed the buyer of the late shipment. The issuing bank had also been notified at this time.
43
When the confirming bank was made aware of this, it refused to pay due to the fraudulent nature of the documents. The beneficiary then brought an action for wrongful dishonour of the credit. where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue. 44 The ule as e plai ed as a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, if plai E glish is to e p efe ed, f aud u a els all.'
45
This directs the court to focus its attention on the beneficiary to determine whether he has engaged in any wrongdoing in relation to the documents. In such circumstances where, for example, the beneficiary had deliberately falsified the documents or presented documents without having shipped the contract goods, the court will accept evidence extraneous to the documents to substantiate the e efi ia 's o gdoi g. This a i ol e di e t e idence from a third party, documentary evidence relating to the underlying contract or a sample of the contractual goods. 46 However, in United City Merchants, the fraud was perpetrated by a third party ithout the e efi ia 's knowledge meaning that the fraud exception could not operate.
There is no doubt that in constructing the fraud exception in this way, Lord Diplock was attempting to limit the scope of judicial intervention. Secondly, the focus on wrongdoing by the beneficiary means that defects in the documents perpetrated by a third party will not trigger the fraud exception. Specifically, documents which are known to be forged at the time of presentation but which appear to conform did 
The narrow confines of the English fraud exception
The driving force behind the narrow parameters of the fraud exception was, as noted above, In addition, Ackner LJ subsequently commented on the American approach in United Trading which speaks directly to English fears connected to a broader exception:
It is interesting to observe that in America, where concern to avoid irreparable damage to international commerce is hardly likely to be lacking, interlocutory relief appears to be o e easil o tai a le…The e is o suggestio that this o e li e al app oa h has esulted i … o e ial dislo atio … 57
In Sztejn the fraudulent seller had deliberately failed to ship any of the contract goods. This was analysed by Shientag J as fraud in the transaction 58 but because the documents appeared to conform, the fraud was also documentary in nature, consisting of material misrepresentations in the bill of lading.
59
This was subsequently codified in Article 5, UCC.
Accordingly, unless the presentation was made by an innocent third party -a nominated bank or a person in the position of a holder in due course
60
-the bank was entitled to reject:
when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of the credit but a e ui ed do u e t…is fo ged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction 61 This is broader than the English exception. It recognises forgery as a basis for intervention and does not require that the beneficiary was the author nor aware of the defects. to United City Merchants, the bank would have been justified in rejecting the presentation; the bill of lading contained a false shipment date and the person seeking payment -the beneficiary -was not a protected party under the UCC. This was not the conclusion drawn by Lord Diplock. Instead, he argued that a beneficiary unaware of defects remained entitled to payment in America: This is certainly not so under the Uniform Commercial Code as against a person who has taken a draft drawn under the credit in circumstances that would make him a holder in due course, and I see no reason why, and there is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery should be in any worse position because he has not negotiated the draft before presentation.
But this, with respect, was incorrect. The UCC did not extend protection to the beneficiary in these circumstances and, moreover, to equate the beneficiary with the holder in due course is spurious. This is because, as Goode has argued, the beneficiary under a credit is not like a holder in due course of a bill of exchange; he is only entitled to be paid if the documents are Article 5 was revised in 1995. This recodification was designed to narrow the fraud exception and clarify the criteria for the grant of an injunction. 63 As such, Article 5 now provides that unless payment is demanded by a protected party, 64 the bank can reject a presentation which: appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant 65 Whilst noting the express purpose of the 1995 revisions, it remains the case that the American exception is broader and more likely to be invoked than its English counterpart. The opening sentence of Article 5 confirms that the court has jurisdiction in cases where the fraud appears on the face of the documents. Despite the apparent similarity with the English approach, Article 5 is substantially broader because it does not require that the fraud is connected to the beneficiary. 66 Thus, where a document has been forged or is materially fraudulent, the court will focus on the character of the document rather than the identity of the wrongdoer. 67 This means that fraud by a third party unconnected to the beneficiary -as was the case in to the party seeking to invoke the fraud exception. In particular, materiality is judged by reference to the underlying contract and to the impact of fraud on the purchaser. 74 This makes sense given that the American exception encompasses both documentary fraud and that related to the underlying contract. By way of illustration, a material fraud would have been committed where, in a contract for the sale of 1000 barrels of oil, the beneficiary presented apparently complying documentation but had only shipped five of the required barrels. Recently, Dolan has argued that ate ialit ill ot e eas to satisf si e the ou ts' i te tio , i i te p eti g A ti le , is to narrow the fraud exception.
78
It is likely, therefore, the courts will require a greater number of the barrels to be missing before short delivery is deemed fraudulent. It is also arguable that permitted tolerances in the UCP would influence the appropriate tipping point. In particular, article 30b permits a tolerance of +/-5% in quantity unless the credit explicitly stipulates the The discussion in Part 4 will reflect on what the comparative discussion means for the future of the English fraud rule. Specifically, it will be argued that the narrow parameters established by Lord Diplock can no longer be justified in the interests of commercial need and demand reconsideration. Attention now turns to the second difficulty following Lo d Diplo k's analysis; the fate of documents proven to be forged or null at the time of presentation.
The conflation of fraud and documentary compliance
Having determined that the fraud exception was not operative, Lord Diplock then proceeded to consider the impact of documents which appeared to be those demanded by the credit but were actually forged or null. This, as shall be seen in due course, had occupied significant ti e at the Cou t of Appeal. Ho e e , efo e the su sta ti e aspe ts of Lo d Diplo k's judgment are considered, the concepts of forgery and nullity will be illustrated. This clearly impacts the ultimate purchaser of the goods but, more significantly, will also deprive the issuing bank of p ote tio i the e e t of its usto e 's insolvency.
So, how should banks respond to presentations which contain forged or null documents? Lord Diplock fi st app oa hed this issue setti g out the a k's o t a tual o ligatio , a el to pay against presentations which appeared to conform to the credit:
…as between confirming bank and issuing bank and as between issuing bank and the buyer the contractual duty of each bank under a confirmed irrevocable credit is to examine with reasonable care all documents presented in order to ascertain that they appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit, and, if they do so appear, to pay… 93 It as o e t to ha a te ise the a k's dut u de the UCP to e a i e the do u e ts ith reasonable care as a contractual obligation.
94
This examination is confined to the documents the sel es as is e ide t i the ph ase o thei fa e'. This goes too far. To characterise the bank as legally liable to the beneficiary for noncompliant presentations wholly overlooks the significance of conformity in a sale by documents. The suggestion that the contracts created by the credit should be identicalat hed a o espo di g o t a tual lia ilit ' -also undermines the doctrine of autonomy. As noted earlier, autonomy demands that each contract is enforced on its own terms and treated as distinct from the other contracts within the network. This is not the same as requiring each contract to mirror the others in the network, as appears to be the th ust of Lo d Diplo k's a gu e t here. The determination that forgery could not ground reje tio of the do u e ts as also elia t o Lo d Diplo k's eadi g of the UCC. He argued:
I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the premiss as to forged documents is correct, even where the fact that the document is forged deprives it of all legal effect and makes it a nullity, and so worthless to the confirming bank as security for its advances to the buyer. This is certainly not so under the Uniform Commercial Code as against a person who has taken a draft drawn under the credit in circumstances that would make him a holder in due course, and I see no reason why, and there is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery should be in any worse position because he has not negotiated the draft before presentation.
102
We know from the earlier discussion, however, that this was incorrect; the UCC does and did not equate the holder in due course with the innocent beneficiary. The former is entitled to payment when they are unaware of the forgery, 103 the latter is not. His Lordship declined to reach a conclusion on the nullity point since the issue did not arise directly. Respectfully, therefore, Lord Diplock was incorrect to characterise the bank as obliged to pay against documents proven to contain defects at presentation. This was apparent at the time;
a different analysis more faithful to the UCP had been adopted by the Court of Appeal 106 and also prompted contemporaneous criticism from Roy Goode.
107
The Court of Appeal focussed on documentary compliance and concluded, critically, that a forged document was to be regarded as non-complying even if the beneficiary was unaware of it:
If the signature on the bill of lading had been forged, a fact of which the sellers were ex hypothesi ignorant, but of which the bank was aware when the document was presented, I can see no valid basis upon which the bank would be entitled to take up the drafts and debit their customer… A banker cannot be compelled to honour a credit unless all the conditions precedent have been performed, and he ought not to be under an obligation to accept or pay against documents which he knows to be waste paper. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the banker of that security for his advances, which is a cardinal feature of the process of financing carried out by means of the credit 108
As such, documentary compliance was considered wholly distinct from the wrongdoing of the beneficiary, the latter being dealt with under the fraud exception. This distinction, significantly, did not mean that the policy arguments employed by Lord Diplock had been ignored by the Court of Appeal:
…the fewer the cases in which a bank is entitled to hold up payment the better for the smooth running of international trade. But I do not think that the Courts have a duty to assist international trade to run smoothly if it is fraudulent … Banks trust beneficiaries to present honest documents; if beneficiaries go to others (as they have to) for the documents they present, it is important to all concerned that those documents should accord,
109
The differences in approach adopted by the appellate courts are fascinating. Significantly, it cannot be explained by differences in counsel nor the arguments employed before the respective courts. But if it did not conform, the customer does not need to rely on any negligence by the issuing or notifying bank in failing to detect the forgery, for independently of negligence, the issuing bank would be in breach of its contract with the customer if it paid the beneficiary on presentation of that document.
112
This, it is submitted, represents Lord Diplock analysing forgery as a matter of documentary compliance in which the knowledge of the beneficiary is irrelevant. This is wholly opposed to the position he adopted in United City Merchants and adds weight to the suggestion that his subsequent analysis was mistaken.
Goode's iti ue, hi h e e ged shortly after United City Merchants, mirrored the logic of the Court of Appeal judgment. His main contention was that the House of Lords had overlooked two distinct aspects of the enquiry when documents are presented under a credit:
pre-conditions that the beneficiary must satisfy to become entitled to payment and defences to payment.
113
I Goode's a al sis, these ope ated se ue tiall ith the i itial fo us o whether the beneficiary had done everything required by the contract to become entitled to payment, namely to present the documents stipulated by the credit.
114
Significantly, this obligation does not depend on the documents merely appearing to conform. Therefore, if there are known defects at the time of presentation, the bank would be entitled to reject the presentation irrespective of who was responsible for the defects and of whether the beneficiary was aware of it. Non-conforming documents cannot be rendered conforming si pl i tue of the e efi ia 's ig o a e of those defe ts.
115
This was the very myth that
Lo d Diplo k's judg e t appea ed to e premised on. Importantly, this does not change the a k's dut of e a i atio ; the a k e ai s e titled to pa i i u sta es he e the documents appear to conform but should not be so entitled where defects have been established at the time of presentation. If the bank opts to reject, the beneficiary may retender within the timeframe permitted under the credit.
116
Once the documents are deemed to comply, the autonomous nature of the credit means that it should be virtually impossible to disrupt payment to the beneficiary.
117
Indeed, the only justification for nonpayment would be where the beneficiary had engaged in wrongdoing or was aware of material misrepresentations in the documents and evidence of this was demonstrated within the short timeframe permitted for document examination.
Legal a al sis aside, Lo d Diplo k's judg e t has had sig ifi a t p a ti al o se ue es fo the efficiency of the credit mechanism, ironically the very thing that he sought to safeguard.
The orthodox account of the credit mechanism values the doctrines of autonomy and strict compliance equally; both are considered vital for the success of the mechanism. However, in overrode the agreed risk allocation in respect of defects known at the time of presentation.
Characterised correctly, the risk of such defects falls on the credit beneficiary since the presentation would not be complying and thus susceptible to rejection by the bank. Not only is this the allocation agreed by the parties in the credit by virtue of the doctrine of strict compliance, it is also the allocation traditionally recognised as the most efficient since the beneficiary is best placed to choose, and then exert control over, the person issuing the requisite documents. In advocating a new approach to defective documents, the practical shortcomings of the current fraud exception cannot be ignored, particularly given the policy considerations u de pi i g Lo d Diplo k's judg e t.
Despite po e ful a ade i disse ts, Lo d Diplo k's a al sis has e ai ed pe suasi e i subsequent judicial considerations of documentary credits. This makes it all the more important that the proper treatment of defective documents is reconsidered in light of recent developments. Happily, this conflation is much harder to justify following the most recent version of the UCP and comparative case law on nullities. The most significant of these -the UCP 600 -was introduced in 2007 to overcome inter alia the high rate of discrepant presentations, estimated to affect 70% of presentations.
123
The UCP 600 deletes all ut o e efe e e to o thei fa e'. It is o e pli it that the pa i g a k's o t a tual o ligatio is o l e gaged he a p ese tatio is o pl i g,'
124
as distinct from a presentation which appears to comply. In cases where the presentation is not o pl i g, a ks a efuse to ho ou o egotiate' the edit.
125
The notion of apparent o plia e o o l appea s i esta lishi g the a ks' dut he do u e ts a e p ese ted;
123 UCP 600, foreword. 124 UCP 600 Art 7a, Art 8a, Art 15a. 125 UCP 600 Art 16a.
a el to assess hethe the do u e ts appea o thei fa e to o stitute a complying p ese tatio .'
126
This reinforces the fact that banks must not look beyond the documents nor investigate their genuineness but simply conduct a visual examination of the documents.
127
This preserves the earlier position, established in Gian Singh, that banks which have examined documents without negligence will be entitled to reimbursement notwithstanding the subsequent discovery of defects. This repeats the mistake of United City Merchants; null documents are tied to the fraud exception and beneficiary misconduct and not considered as a matter affecting compliance.
Furthermore, the policy arguments used to justify this position were, with respect, specious.
Potte LJ suggested that a ullit e eptio ould esult i u desi a le i oads i to the should affect the legal response to fraud and defects known at presentation.
Conclusion
This article has argued that recent judicial and legislative developments require e o side atio of the ke de ates t igge ed Lo d Diplo k's a al sis i United City
Merchants. Accordingly, consideration now turns to how a modern court should approach the fraud exception and documents known to contain defects on presentation.
To begin with the shape of the fraud exception, it will be recalled that Lord Diplock constructed the fraud exception narrowly so that courts could only intervene in the most e eptio al of i u sta es. To do othe ise, he a gued, ould u de i e the hole the American approach to fraud reveals that this policy consideration does not withstand scrutiny. This is because the broader approach to fraud enshrined in the UCC has not resulted in the commercial disruption feared by Lord Diplock and subsequent English courts.
Co e sel , i fa t, Ba es a d B e ha e el o ed the spe ifi it ith hi h the LC f aud exception is addressed in section 5-'
147
and attribute this to a reduction in litigation. In this way, the 1995 revisions achieve their aim, namely to reduce the likelihood of judicial intervention in credit transactions.
148
The development of the respective fraud rules also merits brief comment. The English rule, as we know, is wholly a product of the common law. By contrast, the American exception codified the decision in Sztejn Bus La , .
Task Fo e o the Stud of UCC A ti le Lette s of C edit , A e a i atio of UCC A ti le Lette s of C edit ' -1990) A continued preference for a narrow exception would be entirely acceptable; indeed, this u h is e pli it i the ICC's o ti ued efusal to legislate fo f aud i the UCP. If a futu e English court wishes to retain a narrow fraud exception, however, the American experience tells us that more compelling policy arguments will be required to justify this approach. The suggestion made here is that a modern court needs not only to strengthen the policy analysis of the fraud exception but also to view beneficiary wrongdoing holistically. To regard beneficiary wrongdoing as the trigger for the fraud exception is wholly correct since, on the analysis adopted here, all known defects will be dealt with as a matter of compliance.
However, wrongdoing should be defined broadly so as to include fraud by the beneficiary in the underlying transaction. To do otherwise emasculates the notion of ex turpi causa and prevents the court from carrying out this important policy role. The current myopic focus on the documents is illogical and it would clearly be preferable if any fraud by the beneficiary in connection with the credit could oust the doctrine of autonomy. Indeed, in the context of preventing payment under a performance guarantee, the Court of Appeal have appeared receptive to the notion that fraudulent misrepresentation inducing the underlying contract justified judicial intervention.
152
It is hoped that this decision would be persuasive to the Supreme Court should a similar issue arise involving a documentary credit.
The second issue triggered by United City Merchants was the fate of documents known to o tai defe ts at the ti e of p ese tatio . As a e i de , Lo d Diplo k's a al sis o liged banks to pay notwithstanding that the presentation contained a forgery.
153
This analysis was subsequently extended to null documents in Montrod.
154
The underlying premise of this analysis -that beneficiary knowledge was required before the bank could reject the presentation -was flawed. In this regard, the UCP 600 fundamentally changes matters and makes it much easier to recognise known defects as an objective issue affecting documentary compliance. Indeed, the a a do e t of all ut o e efe e e to o thei fa e' o fi s that the beneficiary is only guaranteed payment in return for a o pl i g p ese tatio .' 155 The otio of appa e t o plia e is o solel tied to the a k's e title e t to ei u se e t in circumstances where, despite a visual examination of the documents, they could not have uncovered the defect.
156 Accordingly, the current UCP provides clear doctrinal support for a distinction between strict compliance and defences to payment.
So how then should a modern court respond to known nullities and forgeries? The weight of academic comment favours a right to reject nullities. 157 Clearly, there is no way that a null document can be described as complying if the defect is known at the time of presentation and so to require payment in these circumstances would be preposterous. To entitle rejection, conversely, is clearly correct when the broader significance of nullities for the ultimate purchaser and the issuing bank is considered. This approach, moreover, would reflect the rationale in Sanders v Maclean which prioritised protection against insolvency in commercial transactions. Indeed, to do otherwise may well result in banks becoming less willing to finance documentary credit transactions.
154 Montrod (n7) [56] Recent appellate litigation on nullities lends further support to the notion that null documents should justify rejection by the bank. In particular, the discussion in Beam Technology correctly distinguishes compliance from beneficiary wrongdoing and this analysis, in contrast to that in Montrod, is more compatible with the UCP 600. Critically, Beam Technology also provides a route by which to circumvent supposed definitional issues surrounding nullity which could be employed to distinguish Montrod in a suitable case.
However, academic commentators have failed to reach unanimity in respect of forged documents. At its broadest, the notion of non-conformity would entitle the bank to reject documents containing any known forgery, fraudulent misstatement or nullity at the time of presentation. There is considerable support for this standard of non-conformity, 158 including Goode himself:
The short point is that the UCP and the terms of every credit require the presentation of specified documents, that is, documents which are what they purport to be, and there is no warrant for the conclusion that this entitles the beneficiary to present, for example, any old piece of paper which purports to be a bill of lading … even if it is forged, unauthorised, or otherwise fraudulent. 159 However, other commentators -including Goode elsewhere in his work 160 -have favoured a narrower approach which only recognises nullities as non-complying. 161 Goode's atio ale as 158 that document in question remained capable of serving its intended commercial purpose; the insertion of a false shipping date in the bill of lading did not prevent it from being what it purported to be.' 162 Respectfully, this is Goode having his cake and eating it too; it is impossible to champion the sequential analysis and simultaneously affirm the outcome in United City Merchants. Put simply, a falsely dated bill of lading is not a complying document and should thus justify rejection. Accordingly, the broad view of non-conformity is preferred here.
Of course, a broader conception of non-conformity carries the risk that more presentations would be rejected. This is significant given that the impetus for reform of the UCP was to reduce the high rate of discrepant presentations. This, it is submitted, would not cause problems in practice since the doctrine of waiver in the UCP enables the issuing bank to approach the applicant where the documents do not appear to constitute a complying presentation to authorise payment. 163 This should mean that defective presentations would only be rejected when payment had not been authorised by the applicant. We already know that waiver is used extensively in practice. In Ronald Mann's e pi i al stud f o the late 1990s, more than 70% of presentations in 500 credit transactions were discrepant 164 and these discrepancies ranged from minor, immaterial matters to substantive non-performance by the beneficiary. 165 Notwithstanding these discrepancies, full payment was made via waiver in all but one case, in which a payment of 94% of the contract price was made.
166
If applicants are typically prepared to waive documentary issues when they know substantive 162 Goode (n9) this should overcome concern about the disruptive effect of recognising forged documents as non-compliant. Indeed, the speed with which waiver was obtained in this study -typically within one banking day 168 -coupled with the fact that waiver does not extend the time for document examination, 169 should allay fears that credit transactions will become less secure if forged and null documents are to justify rejection. The de elop e t of ode o u i atio s si e Ma 's stud should fa ilitate oth the speed of the waiver process and interactions between the contracting parties.
170
As a result, the prevalence of waiver in practice suggests that banks would only need to exercise an entitlement to reject rarely as a means of safeguarding their position. Critically, nothing in this analysis would prevent the beneficiary from retendering documents before the expiry of the credit.
The standard of proof, discussed earlier, is also relevant to the treatment of forged and null documents. The same time constraints which affect the invocation of the fraud exception would apply here; evidence of the defect would need to be established within five banking days to reject the documents as non-complying. This issue may well be less problematic in this context. Firstly, evidence would be limited to the existence of the forgery or nullity itself; the applicant or issuing bank would not be required to attribute the defect to the beneficiary.
This clearly reduces the evidential burden. In addition, the availability of the International Maritime Bureau's do u e t authe ti atio se i e, coupled with improvements in 167 Katz (n18) 
